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In this paper, we examine why risk-based policy instruments have failed to improve the
proportionality, effectiveness, and legitimacy of healthcare quality regulation in the
National Health Service (NHS) in England. Rather than trying to prevent all possible
harms, risk-based approaches promise to rationalise and manage the inevitable limits of
what regulation can hope to achieve by focusing regulatory standard-setting and enforce-
ment activity on the highest priority risks, as determined through formal assessments of
their probability and consequences. As such, risk-based approaches have been enthusias-
tically adopted by healthcare quality regulators over the last decade. However, by drawing
on historical policy analysis and in-depth interviews with 15 high-level UK informants in
2013–2015, we identify a series of practical problems in using risk-based policy instru-
ments for defining, assessing, and ensuring compliance with healthcare quality standards.
Based on our analysis, we go on to consider why, despite a succession of failures,
healthcare regulators remain committed to developing and using risk-based approaches.
We conclude by identifying several preconditions for successful risk-based regulation:
goals must be clear and trade-offs between them amenable to agreement; regulators must
be able to reliably assess the probability and consequences of adverse outcomes; regulators
must have a range of enforcement tools that can be deployed in proportion to risk; and
there must be political tolerance for adverse outcomes.
Keywords: risk; regulation and governance; healthcare quality; National Health
Service (NHS); Care Quality Commission
Introduction
Over the last 30 years, the desire to improve the quality of healthcare has been the one
constant amidst near ceaseless reforms to the British National Health Service (NHS).
Whereas Thatcher-era reforms of the 1980s looked to dedicated managers and to the
discipline of the internal market ‘to secure the best deal for patients and the community
health within available resources’ (Griffiths, 1983, para. 3), subsequent governments
created independent watchdogs, charging a succession of steadily more powerful regula-
tory agencies with monitoring quality and ensuring standards. But the experience of
healthcare regulators has not been a happy one. External regulatory inspection and over-
sight have proved both costly and controversial, with critics highlighting the perverse
consequences for care quality of ham-fisted regulation (Bevan & Hood, 2006). In
response to such difficulties, healthcare regulators have increasingly adopted so-called
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‘risk-based’ approaches to regulation. In this article, we examine how and why these risk-
based approaches have failed to improve the regulation of healthcare quality.
The central conceit of risk-based regulation is that regulators cannot, and indeed
should not even try, to prevent all possible harms. Instead, regulatory interventions should
focus on controlling the greatest potential threats to achieving regulatory objectives, as
determined through ex ante assessments of their probability and consequences.
Prioritising regulatory activities in this risk-based way promises to make regulation
more effective and proportionate (Rothstein, 2006). To that end, successive UK
Governments have enthusiastically promoted risk as a central principle of ‘better regula-
tion’ and since 2008 have mandated its use for targeting regulatory inspection and
enforcement activities (BIS, 2014). Accordingly, risk-based approaches now feature
prominently in the regulation of many aspects of healthcare, from certifying medical
professionals and assuring the safety of devices to managing financial failures by NHS
Trusts (Challoner & Vodra, 2011; Lloyd-Bostock & Hutter, 2008; Murrary, Imison, &
Jabbal, 2014; Phipps, Noyce, Walshe, Parker, & Ashcroft, 2011).
Care quality regulation is perhaps the most notable example of this trend. Building on
the statistical surveillance techniques developed by its predecessors, the Care Quality
Commission (CQC) has sought to make its regulatory interventions more ‘risk-based’ by
targeting those providers at greatest statistical risk of failing to meet the required stan-
dards. Despite the technical sophistication of these risk-based prioritisation systems,
however, the CQC and its predecessors were severely criticised for failing to prevent
several high-profile breakdowns in care quality – most notably at Mid-Staffordshire Trust
(Francis, 2013) – prompting two successive Chairs and a Chief Executive of the CQC to
resign between its creation in 2008 and 2012. In response, the CQC fundamentally
reformed its regulatory approach and redoubled its efforts to be risk based (Care
Quality Commission (CQC), 2013b). But its latest system for prioritising hospital inspec-
tions was found not to work (Griffiths, Beaussier, Demeritt, & Rothstein, 2016), and the
CQC (2015e) is currently revising its risk-based model once again. In this article, we
examine the reasons for these failures in order to improve understanding of the conditions
necessary for successful risk-based regulation.
The promise and problems of risk-based regulation
Before examining why risk-based regulation has not worked for healthcare quality, it is
worth reviewing what it promises to achieve. Promoted internationally by organisations,
such as the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the
European Union (EU), risk-based approaches have become a common trope of regulatory
reform programmes around the world; marking a shift in the relationship between risk and
regulation (Rothstein, Borraz, & Huber, 2013). Risk is no longer simply the object of
regulatory control, be it potential harms such as pharmacological side effects and work-
place accidents or from newly defined threats such as radicalisation or invasions of digital
privacy. Rather, risk has also become a central means for making regulation socially
optimal by using formal risk assessments of probability and consequence both to define
regulatory objectives as well as target only the greatest threats to achieving those
objectives (Black & Baldwin, 2010; OECD, 2010). To do otherwise – so the argument
goes – can be grossly inefficient, inadvertently create other risks, or distract attention from
more serious problems. By redefining what adverse outcomes can be counted as successes
or failures through the language of acceptable or unacceptable risk, risk-based approaches
2 A.-L. Beaussier et al.
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also provide a means for regulators to account for the limits of what regulation can, and
should, seek to achieve (Dodds & Kodate, 2011; Power, 2007; Rothstein, Huber, &
Gaskell, 2006).
To that end, risk-based ideas and instruments can be used to reorganise the three essential
feedback control functions that, from a conventional cybernetics perspective, define a reg-
ulatory regime (Hood, Rothstein, & Baldwin, 2001). First in setting regulatory goals, risk-
based principles and instruments can be used to define qualified – rather than absolute –
regulatory standards. One example is the UK’s long-standing workplace safety requirement
that workers should be protected against harm only ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’; a legal
principle that explicitly balances the probability and consequence of harms occurring against
the cost, time, and effort of reducing potential harms further (Demeritt, Rothstein, Beaussier,
& Howard, 2015). Second, risk instruments can be used to organise information gathering
about the extent to which a regulated system is meeting regulatory goals. Examples include
probabilistic sampling to scrutinise financial transactions that are most likely to be in breach of
money laundering regulations (Wesseling, 2013) or probabilistically qualifying predictions of
whether and where it will flood (Demeritt, Nobert, Cloke, & Pappenberger, 2013; Kuklicke &
Demeritt, 2016). Finally, risk-based approaches to enforcement and implementation use risk
to calibrate a ‘pyramid’ of escalating regulatory interventions in proportion to the probability
and consequence of non-compliance with regulatory goals (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992).
Thus, the ‘pupil premium’ in England targets additional resources to schools with more
economically disadvantaged pupils ‘at risk’ of failing (National Audit Office (NAO), 2015b),
while actuarial sentencing uses formal risk assessments of offender recidivism to determine
the nature and length of custodial sentences handed down to convicted criminals (Hannah-
Moffat, 2013).
However, research on risk-based regulation in other domains highlights a number of
potential problems in applying this approach to regulating healthcare quality. First, there is
the question of ‘risks to what?’ In animal welfare regulation, for example, goal ambiguity
has made it difficult both to define clear standards and to calibrate regulatory interventions
in proportion to risk of non-compliance (Escobar & Demeritt, 2016). In healthcare, there
are similar ambiguities about the very meaning of quality and thus how a ‘risk’ to it might
be defined. Although some medical experts insist ‘quality can be defined and measured’
objectively (Chassin & Galvin, 1998, p. 1001), in practice conceptions of quality have
rarely attracted consensus among the policy and medical communities or wider publics.
The ambiguity is captured by Donabedian’s (1988) influential triadic model, which frames
healthcare quality through three distinct dimensions of ‘structures’ (including facilities,
staffing, budgets, and capacities), ‘processes’ (for example, care procedures, systems, and
organisations), and ‘outcomes’ (such as clinical effectiveness, public health, and satisfac-
tion). Indeed, quality regimes in other domains, such as higher education, have experi-
enced similar difficulties in defining their objects and thus in organising quality regulation
according to risk (Gibbs, 2010; Griffiths, 2016; Huber & Rothstein, 2013).
Second, risk-based regulation is also difficult without agreement on the acceptability
of potential adverse outcomes. In the food safety domain, for example, it has been much
harder for the various interest groups to agree on acceptable risk thresholds than in
workplace health and safety, where there are just two principle interest groups – employ-
ers and employees – who share a common interest in agreeing regulatory trade-offs
between cost and safety in order to protect profits and job security (Demeritt et al.,
2015). Arguably, healthcare is like food safety: it has high public salience and involves
numerous organised interest groups with little incentive to compromise their preferences.
Health, Risk & Society 3
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
ing
s C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 01
:39
 28
 Ju
ne
 20
16
 
As Sir Donald Irvine (2006) – a former President of the General Medical Council (GMC)
has commented:
The [risk-based] strategy is not compatible with the concept of a guarantee to the public of a
good doctor for all … The government will need to demonstrate that it has the public’s fully
informed consent if it decides to support this line. After all it is patients, not doctors, who may
be killed or injured by poor doctoring. (p. 431)
Even when it is possible to agree about the ex ante acceptability of potential adverse
outcomes, those regulatory compromises are sometimes forgotten when adverse outcomes
actually occur. For example, during the extensively televised 2014 flooding of the
Somerset Levels in South West England, the prime minister disavowed the Environment
Agency’s risk-based strategy for prioritising national flood defence investments in propor-
tion to risk, insisting that ‘money is no object’ and allocating an additional £20 million for
dredging and other local alleviation schemes in Somerset that failed the Agency’s
cost–benefit test (Demeritt, 2014). The National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence has faced similar difficulties upholding its recommendations about which
drugs should be available on the NHS in the face of political pressure from patient groups
keen to have life-saving cancer drugs funded regardless of their cost-effectiveness (Ferner
& McDowell, 2006).
Third, methodological challenges in assessing risk can make risk-based regulation
difficult to implement. In the domain of water quality regulation, for example, risk-based
strategies have struggled to deal with non-point water pollution, because the huge number
and variety of potential sources make it difficult to identify and effectively target which
sources pose the greatest risk (Black & Baldwin, 2012). Risk-based targeting is particu-
larly difficult when the underlying base rate of occurrence for a hazard is very low. Thus,
even if psychiatric risk assessments were much more sensitive than they actually are, the
rate of violent psychosis is so low that the number of people falsely identified as posing a
risk to others would still be many times larger than the number correctly identified as
dangerous and involuntarily committed as a result (Szmukler & Rose, 2013). Just like
medical diagnosis (Swets, 1988), regulation is similarly plagued by difficult trade-offs
between type 1 (false positive) and type 2 (false negative) detection errors (Black, 2010).
But even with the best data in the world, there is an irreducibly normative element to
indicator construction, selection, and application, which makes them politically conten-
tious. For example, in education (Acquah, 2013), the Conservative-led government
scrapped the ‘contextual value added’ measure introduced in 2006 under Labour to take
student affluence into account in school league tables on the grounds that it is ‘morally
wrong to have an attainment measure which entrenches low aspirations for children
because of their background’ (Department for Education, 2010, para. 6.13) .
Finally, there can also be legal and institutional obstacles to organising regulation in
proportion to risk. For example, the European Court of Justice recently banned insurers
from charging differential premiums to male and female drivers based on actuarial
differences in accident rates between the sexes (Edmonds, 2013). Similarly anti-racist
campaigners have long complained that risk-based profiling of potential terrorism sus-
pects (Amoore, 2006), like stop-and-search policing more generally (Bowling & Phillips,
2007), is racially discriminatory and thus illegal under equalities legislation. Even when it
is legally permissible, calibrating institutional responses in proportion to risk can conflict
with the wider matrix of political and organisational pressures. Thus, government
demands that universities vet external speakers to reduce the risk of Islamic radicalisation
4 A.-L. Beaussier et al.
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have met with fierce resistance from champions of academic freedom and free speech
(Times Higher Education, 2016).
In the analysis that follows, we will consider whether and how these difficulties
experienced in other domains of risk-based regulation manifest themselves in the parti-
cular case of healthcare quality in England. In particular, we will examine the use of risk-
based policy instruments for defining, assessing, and enforcing regulatory standards and
explain why they have failed to achieve the wider goals of healthcare quality regulation.
Methods
The paper adopts a qualitative methodology combining policy document analysis and in-
depth interviews in 2014–2015 with 15 high-level informants closely involved in the
design, implementation and reform of successive care quality regulators. Those infor-
mants include past and serving senior civil servants, regulators, NHS officials, politicians,
and professional group representatives. Interviews were conducted following a protocol
approved by the King’s College London Research Ethics Committee (REP(GSSHM)/13/
14-5). Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and thematically coded for comparison
against documentary sources. Using both source and method triangulation to ensure
validity (Baxter & Eyles, 1997), we draw on this dataset to systematically analyse the
technical and contextual challenges to applying risk-based concepts and policy instru-
ments to the three functional components of healthcare quality regimes: defining the goals
of quality regulation; assessing quality; and enforcing compliance with those quality
goals. In the following section, we start by setting out the background to healthcare
quality regulation and then go on to examine each regulatory component in turn.
Findings: healthcare quality regulation in the NHS
Background and history
Care quality has only been formally regulated since the turn of the millennium. For most
of its history, care quality in the NHS was left to doctors, overseen only by the centuries-
old royal medical colleges. Responding to increasing public complaints and the scandal
over high death rates among infant heart patients at Bristol Royal Infirmary (Alaszewski,
2002; Bevan, 2008), the 1999 Health Act imposed a new statutory ‘Duty of Quality’ on
NHS Trust Boards. This duty was enforced through the creation of a new independent
regulatory regime, which has seen a remarkable churn of regulators, mandates, standards,
and practices.
The first quality regulator was the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI). Its
mandate was to advise on and review the ‘clinical governance’ processes put in place by
NHS Trusts to fulfil their Duty of Quality. Although CHI had no formal sanctioning
powers, it publicly star-rated NHS Trusts based on their performance against key national
targets (Bevan & Cornwell, 2006, p. 10) and its rolling peer reviews identified serious
quality assurance failures, prompting a number of hospital chief executives to resign
(Nuffield Trust, 2013).
The 2003 Health and Social Care Act replaced CHI with a more powerful regulator,
the Healthcare Commission (HCC), as part of wider NHS reforms aimed at increasing
capacity through competition and the involvement of private healthcare providers. To that
end, the new regulator was given enhanced enforcement powers and a dedicated profes-
sional inspectorate to publicly rate quality and compliance with a set of new detailed
Health, Risk & Society 5
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standards, performance targets, and quality assurance requirements as part of its ‘Annual
Health Check’ of NHS Trusts. Faced with overseeing a large number of complex
healthcare organisations, the HCC commissioned the first risk-based monitoring system
for detecting statistical abnormalities in NHS hospital performance and triggering unan-
nounced inspections (Bevan & Cornwell, 2006).
The HCC was in turn abolished by the 2008 Health and Social Care Act, which
consolidated quality regulators from across the health, social, and mental healthcare sectors
under a new Care Quality Commission (CQC). Whereas CHI had been responsible for
monitoring care quality in just 500 or so NHS organisations, the CQC was responsible for
licencing and assuring care quality outcomes in almost 50,000 registered health and social
care providers across England. In developing ‘a generic regulatory model that could be
applied to all sectors’, the CQC (2012) adopted a number of explicitly risk-based strategies
for organising its vastly expanded duties. Regular on-site inspections of all providers were
abandoned in favour of risk-based prioritisation, as the number of compliance checks
completed by its new generalist inspectorate ‘fell significantly’ (National Audit Office
(NAO), 2011, p. 8). Targeting was underpinned by an expanded statistical surveillance
system rating all providers for their risk of non-compliance with 16 separate standards.
Blistering criticisms of care quality regulation, however, not least from the Francis
Inquiry (2013) into serious care failures at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust, led to new
quality regulations and wholesale reforms of the CQC’s regulatory model. For its ‘new
start’, the CQC (2013a) developed five new ‘tests’ of care quality, revised its statistical
surveillance system, and returned to regular inspections conducted by new specialist
inspectorates for hospitals, social care, and primary care. However, the new regulatory
model has already run into trouble. In 2015, general practitioners (GPs) complained about
how they were publicly risk rated (Millett, 2015) and then, in 2016, the first peer-reviewed
evaluation of the CQC’s new surveillance system showed that it could not detect risks to
care quality in hospitals (Griffiths et al., 2016).
In the following sections, we examine the historic problems facing healthcare regula-
tors in using risk ideas and policy instruments to help define, assess, and enforce
compliance with quality standards.
Defining risk-based quality standards
The first set of problems facing risk-based approaches to regulating healthcare quality is
in defining their goals in terms of acceptable risk. One challenge is that the concept of
‘quality’ is ambiguous and contested. Over the last 20 years, the Department of Health
(DoH) has redefined statutory care quality frameworks four times, layering new defini-
tions on top of old ones in response both to specific crises, and to changing government
priorities about the trade-offs between treatment volume, cost containment, clinical out-
comes, and patient satisfaction. Thus, the 1999 Health Act imposed the Duty of Quality
on NHS Trusts in response to concerns that the DoH’s long-standing regime of produc-
tivity targets was compromising patient safety. Drawing on fashionable ideas of corporate
governance, the Act required trusts to implement clinical governance controls ‘for the
purpose of monitoring and improving the quality of health care which it provides to
individuals’ (s.18.1). CHI’s clinical governance reviews consequently entailed checking
the internal quality assurance processes of NHS Trusts against national standards set by
professional bodies. Rather than replacing productivity targets, however, CHI’s process-
centred approach to healthcare quality sat alongside them. Indeed, the DoH’s national
target regime was given new emphasis by the publication of Ofsted-style ‘star-ratings’ for
6 A.-L. Beaussier et al.
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individual NHS Trusts, based upon their performance against key national targets, such as
waiting times.
This dual quality regime, however, was criticised for emphasising processes and
inputs over ‘what matters most to patients, carers and the public’ (DoH, 2005, p. 11).
So in 2004, when the HCC was created, the DOH (2006, para. 16) issued a completely
new set of 44 quality standards ‘described in terms of outcomes’, adding yet another layer
to the quality ‘cake’. Reflecting the classical business management nostrum, ‘quality is
what the customer says it is’, these new quality standards incorporated an explicit ‘patient
focus’, including specific requirements on the quality of catering services and for ‘con-
tinuously improv[ing] the patient experience, based on the feedback of patients, carers and
relatives’ (DoH, (2006), p. 32). At the same time, the DOH (2004, p. 9) also cut the
number of performance targets NHS Trusts were required to meet from 62 to 20, and
reduced their emphasis on inputs so that more than half focused on ‘health outcomes and
patient experience’.
When the CQC assumed responsibility for regulating social care as well as healthcare
in 2009, the government had to redefine quality regulations once again. The 44 quality
standards used by HCC were boiled off into ‘a single coherent set’ of 16 more generic
ones that could be applied across both the health and social care sectors (DoH, 2009, para.
1.4). However, those 16 essential quality standards lasted only a few years. After the
Francis Inquiry (Francis, 2013, para. 1.130) called for ‘fundamental standards’ to be ‘set
out in a clear manner so they can be understood and accepted by providers, patients and
the public’, the government revised quality regulations again. A new statutory Duty of
Candour on providers was introduced in 2014 and the 16 ‘essential quality’ standards
were reduced to 11 ‘fundamental standards’, which the CQC currently assesses by asking
if care is ‘Safe’, ‘Effective’, ‘Caring’, ‘Responsive’, and ‘Well-led’.
This instability of regulatory goals and quality definitions has made it difficult ‘to
have a regulatory framework with integrity’, as one regulatory official explained to us.
Each successive reform, he noted, ‘takes apart how regulation has been carried out’ and
forces ‘us to go about designing these regulatory models basically from scratch’. In that
context, it has been difficult to operationalise effective risk-based (or indeed any other)
approaches to regulating what has essentially been a moving target.
A second challenge to defining the goals of regulation in terms of acceptable risk has
been determining the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable outcomes. For
example, regulators and the NHS have struggled to agree ex ante on how far it is
reasonable to go to eliminate what are called ‘never events’, such as wrong site surgery,
which occur with alarming regularity. In 2009, the first year in which they were system-
atically recorded, the CQC reported that there were 111 ‘never events’ across the England
(CQC, 2014b). Although formally unacceptable, ‘never events’ are in practice tolerated
because the measures required to eliminate them, such as abandoning surgical interven-
tions altogether, are even less acceptable than the risk of never events occurring.
With their emphasis on qualified, rather than absolute regulatory goals, risk-based
approaches promise to help manage such trade-offs by using ex ante assessments of
probability and consequence to determine the acceptability of different potential quality
outcomes. However, the politics of healthcare have not been favourable to agreeing trade-
offs between healthcare’s ‘iron triangle’ of access, quality, and cost (Kissick, 1994). As a
former junior health minister explained to us, defining acceptable risks to healthcare
quality ‘is a big challenge … [it is] … very hard for a regulator to come out and say
well, I’m sorry, but we can’t guarantee your safety’. The CQC’s current standards, safe,
effective, caring, responsive, and well-led, do read as a set of conflicting maxims. For
Health, Risk & Society 7
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example, ‘safe’, ‘effective’, and ‘well-led’ hospitals are often consolidated ones benefit-
ting from economies of scale, but local communities, politicians, and patient associations
often resist the closure of what are perceived to be more ‘caring’ and ‘responsive’ district
hospitals (Timmins, 2007). In practice, however, the ambiguity of the CQC’s quality goals
means that trade-offs between them are rarely acknowledged.
Even when regulators and clinicians can agree on what is ex ante acceptable, the high
public saliency and political sensitivity of the NHS mean that there is often little tolerance
for adverse outcomes when they come to light. For example, when hospital acquired
infections burst onto the headlines in the mid-2000s, the DoH set reduction targets but
politicians had little appetite for convincing the public and the media that it would be
disproportionately costly to eradicate such infections completely. Despite expert calls to
‘stop pandering to populism about hospital cleanliness’ and to focus instead on the more
critical factor of bed occupancy rates (The Lancet, 2007, p. 1102), the Labour
Government pledged £50million to ‘deep clean’ every hospital ward in the country
(Watt, 2007). Ministerial interventions are so common, explained one senior civil servant,
because ‘whenever something blows up, it’s always the government’s problem’. But such
interventions tend to undermine previously agreed ex ante compromises between compet-
ing quality goals and to reinforce the tendency for new definitions and standards to layer-
up on top of each other in unstable configurations that are consequently difficult either to
assess or enforce in proportion to risk.
Assessing care quality ‘risks’
Risk-based regulatory approaches face a second set of problems in assessing healthcare
quality. One approach has been to assess quality using peers and inspectors but the
objectivity and credibility of these judgements has often been questioned. Traditional
forms of professional self-regulation relied on the subjective expert judgement of fellow
professionals, but the impartiality of the process was sometimes compromised. For
example, the Bristol Royal Infirmary Public Inquiry cited the hospital’s ‘club culture’ as
one reason why abnormally high mortality rates among paediatric heart patients went
undetected for so long (Kennedy, 2001, para. 8). The rolling quality assurance reviews
introduced by CHI in response to that scandal were more formal and independent, but
trust managers complained about the calibre and qualifications of CHI’s ad hoc teams of
part-time reviewers seconded from elsewhere in the NHS (Day & Klein, 2004).
CHI’s successor, HCC, responded by creating a professional hospital inspectorate that
undertook both regular inspections as well as unannounced visits in response to intelli-
gence about risk. This strategy helped counter what one of our informants termed ‘the
Queen Mother approach’ of hospitals to ‘rolling out the red carpet’ for the visiting
inspectors while ‘sending people who are a bit smelly on leave for the day’. However,
when CQC took over responsibility for assessing quality across the health, social care, and
mental health sectors, it consolidated the specialist inspectorates for those sectors into a
single generalist one. As a result individual inspectors often lacked expertise in the
services they were evaluating, not least those 134 inspectors hired without having ‘the
core competencies to do the job’ in order to plug chronic staff shortages (Hazell, 2014). In
response to damning criticisms (Francis, 2013), the CQC reverted to separate specialist
inspectorates for hospitals, primary care, and social care, with hospital inspections now
conducted by large multidisciplinary teams of experts.
But healthcare is so complicated that even expert inspectors struggle to detect risks to
quality during their necessarily brief inspection visits. As an official involved in
8 A.-L. Beaussier et al.
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healthcare regulation told us, ‘you’d have to be very lucky to spot intermittently bad care
if you’re only physically there for 1% of time where that care has been delivered’. For
another informant, who had retired after many years in a board-level role in quality
regulation, ‘the idea of measuring [quality] through visits, through inspections’ was
‘completely ludicrous’. Detection problems are further compounded by active resistance
from health chiefs keen to minimise any local difficulties, as happened at Mid-
Staffordshire Trust (Francis, 2013).
A second approach to assessing healthcare quality has been to develop surveillance
systems to crunch the wealth of administrative data generated in the NHS and identify
statistical anomalies indicating potential risks to quality. The idea, explained one infor-
mant involved in their development, was ‘to get away from a model of regulation which
waited for disasters to occur and then criticise people’ in favour of ‘a real time under-
standing of what is happening’ so that ‘you can analyse that something is going wrong
before people are actually harmed’. As well as helping regulators ‘make better decisions
about when, where, and what to inspect’ (CQC, 2013b, p. 9), another official noted how
this statistical surveillance could also ‘provide a component of the evidence for the final
judgment’, making quality assessment more objective than relying solely on the subjec-
tive judgements of peer reviewers and professional inspectors (cf. Porter, 1995).
Over the last decade, healthcare regulators have developed a series of different
statistical surveillance models for identifying risks to quality. The first was developed
by the HCC to monitor NHS hospital performance and trigger investigations. Facing
government pressure to cut costs and ‘the burden of regulation year on year’ (CQC, 2009,
para. 12), the CQC built on that ‘big data’ approach to monitor quality and prioritise
inspections across both the health and social care sectors. Its statistical system of ‘quality
and risk profiles’ (QRPs) weighted some 1400 qualitative and quantitative indicators to
score individual providers for their risk of non-compliance against 16 separate quality
standards. After several high-profile detection failures, the CQC (2012, para. 1.2) ‘moved
away from an entirely risk-based model’ for targeting unannounced inspections through
QRPs and developed a more simplified statistical system to inform what and where to
inspect. The new ‘Intelligent Monitoring’ system uses just 150 unweighted indicators to
assess risks to quality. However, recent analysis showed that this tool is wrong more often
than it is right (Griffiths et al., 2016), and so the CQC (2015e) has announced plans to
‘develop a more comprehensive surveillance model’ to replace Intelligent Monitoring.
There are a number of reasons why statistical surveillance systems have so consis-
tently disappointed (Francis, 2013; House of Commons, Health Committee, 2012;
National Audit Office (NAO), 2015a), despite the millions of pounds invested in their
development. Part of the problem is that healthcare regulators face ‘formidable difficulties
in organising the regulation of the quality of healthcare using the data that are routinely
available’ (Bevan & Cornwell, 2006, p. 365). As the CQC (2015a, p. 16) itself recently
conceded, ‘existing data … is not yet robust enough across all sectors to be a reliable
measure of quality’. For example, while the NHS is awash with data, regulators have
relatively little information on private healthcare providers. Data releases typically lag by
many months, meaning statistical analyses cannot detect threats to quality in real time.
Moreover, most NHS data are compiled at trust level, rather than at the site- and specialty-
specific levels where care is actually delivered, so that problems in one part of a trust can
be masked by good outcomes elsewhere.
Selecting appropriate quality indicators is also difficult. For example, successive
governments have promoted subjective patient experience as a key measure of quality,
but medical experts challenge the value of the ‘Friends and Family Test’ and other
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customer satisfaction surveys (Kmietowicz, 2013). One of our informants was particularly
scathing:
The one question that the government insisted we had to ask was ‘were you satisfied with the
treatment you received?’ How the **** would the patient know about the treatment they
received? …. 250 patients in Manchester were satisfied with Dr. Shipman’s treatment and he
killed every one of them. So it’s a wrong measure.
Mortality is more widely accepted as a quality indicator, but constructing robust metrics is
fraught with practical challenges such as normalising raw data to take account of patient
mix and prior health status (Taylor, 2013). In response to complaints that even normalised
mortality rates ‘should not be used to benchmark hospitals’ quality of care’ because they
do not consider how many ‘excess deaths’ were preventable (Ramesh, 2015), the health
secretary recently announced that the NHS would be creating a new ‘avoidable death’
indicator. However, epidemiologists quickly dismissed that measure as ‘meaningless’
because the sample size is too small to identify problematic trusts or specialties within
them (Hazell, 2015). Moreover, the process of statistical benchmarking subtly transforms
the very meaning of quality into a question of relative performance. For example, the
winsorised z-scoring technique used by HCC and CQC rates the performance of indivi-
dual units by comparing their performance on a particular indicator against the truncated
mean of other units of the same type and assigning a score based on the number of
standard deviations from the truncated mean (CQC, 2014a; Spiegelhalter et al., 2012). By
this measure, a trust with very long waiting lists would be excellent if waiting lists
everywhere else were worse still. ‘Lowest relative risk’ may not be the same as ‘accep-
table risk’ when judged against absolute standards of ‘quality care’.
In turn indicators are liable to being ‘gamed’ by regulatees. Thus, the first NHS star
rating system distorted hospital performance by encouraging trusts to focus narrowly on
the relatively small range of targets that were being measured (Bevan & Hood, 2006). The
QRPs responded to this problem by using over 1400 elaborately weighted quantitative and
qualitative indicators (CQC, 2012), but this made the QRPs so complicated that they ‘had
very little traction with inspectors or really with providers’, an official recalled. On the
advice of the consultancy firm McKinsey & Company (DoH, 2015), QRPs were replaced
by a new ‘Intelligent Monitoring’ system, which uses a much smaller selection of
unweighted indicators. But in this unweighted system, the ‘proportion of Healthcare
Workers with direct patient care … vaccinated against seasonal influenza’ bizarrely has
as much bearing on hospital risk ratings as the number of ‘never events’ or methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus incidents (CQC, 2014c).
Statistical surveillance faces a final set of challenges in wider public and political
intolerance for error in risk assessment. While the most recent House of Commons,
Health Committee (2014, p. 6) report claims to ‘accept’ that ‘it will not be possible to
pick up every single error or failure’, it also insists that, ‘The surveillance system must
identify problems and trigger inspections before they become widely publicised by the
media, patient groups or local representatives’ (para 43). However, even egregious instances
of poor quality care, such as the infant deaths at Bristol Royal Infirmary or Dr. Shipman
murdering his patients, are not necessarily detectable at conventional statistical confidence
intervals (Bevan, 2008; Taylor, 2013). In the face of this uncertainty, the CQC could trigger
inspections at lower thresholds of probability, but resource limitations mean ‘limits have to
be set to guard against too many “false alarms” occurring as a result of random variation’
(CQC, 2014a, p. 9). In its early years, resource pressures forced the CQC to set very high
10 A.-L. Beaussier et al.
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thresholds for triggering inspections (National Audit Office (NAO), 2011), which were
subsequently reduced in the wake of the Mid-Staffs scandal. As a former minister explained
the CQC was concerned about being ‘held out to dry’ if ‘something goes belly up’. But this
concern with ‘safeguard[ing] their own position’, as that informant termed it, sits uneasily
with risk-based rationales and comes with high opportunity costs.
Enforcing quality
Risk-based regulatory approaches face a third set of difficulties in calibrating regulatory
enforcement in terms of risk. Since the CQC recognises that ‘it is not feasible or
proportionate to follow up every single breach of standards’ (CQC, 2015b, p. 5), it uses
a formal risk matrix that assesses the probability and consequences of regulatory breaches
to ‘select the appropriate enforcement power’. These powers currently range from simple
advice or public disclosure to more punitive civil enforcement measures, such as warnings
and requirement notices, and in extremis fines, criminal prosecutions, and cancellation of
registration (CQC, 2015c). This enforcement pyramid of escalating sanctions can then, in
theory, be matched to the competence, capacity, and willingness of regulatees to meet
regulatory requirements (cf. Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992).
In practice, however, this risk-based model has proved hard to implement. One reason
is that risk-based enforcement can fall foul of equalities requirements. For example, while
it is not unknown for disproportionately high levels of abuse complaints to be made
against male healthcare professionals, the Professional Standards Authority for Health and
Social Care (PSA, 2015, p. 12) warns that, ‘Taking regulatory action based on an apparent
statistical correlation between harmful behaviour and a group defined by, say its age or
ethnicity, is likely to be discriminatory’.
Even when risk-based enforcement is permissible, regulators have hesitated to deploy
enforcement sanctions. As a senior civil servant from the DoH observed to us:
After the Mid-Staffordshire disaster, there was a view that mechanisms for monitoring risks in
terms of quality were not good.… Actually the main problem was addressing the failures ….
There had been previous reports, including from the Healthcare Commission that had
identified those problems, but nobody really reacted.
Regulators have hesitated to sanction partly for fear of undermining the continuity of
healthcare provision. Financial penalties can be self-defeating if they exacerbate under-
resourcing, while the ultimate sanction of closure is an unrealistic threat for hospital,
ambulance, and mental health trusts who are often local monopoly providers. However,
even closing GP surgeries, which are more numerous, is often politically controversial
(Liverpool Echo, 2015). The 2012 Health and Social Care Act addressed that problem by
giving the CQC power to put trusts into ‘special measures’, which can include imposing
new management and forced mergers with more successful trusts. Within 2 years, some
21 NHS hospital trusts, or more than 10% of all acute trusts in England, had been put into
special measures. But with only a limited number of nearby trusts available to support
those in special measures, there are clearly limits to this last resort approach.
More compliance-oriented enforcement tools for incentivising behaviour change in the
NHS have not been particularly effective either. One reason is that until recently, the CQC
was unable to offer much education and advice because its generalist inspectorate lacked
the expertise to do so. Moreover, even improvement notices were liable to be ignored,
because, as a former special advisor explained to us, inspectors ‘had no credibility with
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the doctors’. This might have changed in 2013 when the CQC’s inspectorate was
reformed with a dedicated expert hospital inspectorate. However, it is not clear that
ignorance of what to do is the major cause of poor quality care in NHS hospitals.
Hospitals are not like restaurants owned by uninformed regulatees who can benefit
from the advice of expert food safety inspectors on meeting food hygiene standards
(Yapp & Fairman, 2006). There is no shortage of technical expertise in hospitals; rather
it is their size, complexity, and multiple goals that make it difficult to ensure consistent
quality across the wide range of services they provide.
Likewise, naming and shaming mechanisms, such as publishing quality ratings, have
created little demand-side pressure to drive up quality standards (Laverty et al., 2012).
The star ratings published by the CHI and HCC from 2001 to 2005, like the Annual
Health Check that succeeded them, were easy to understand, but they rated entire trusts
and, therefore, provided little help to patients selecting the best hospital for hip replace-
ments. Even advocates of patient choice concede that point. As one former health minister
put it, ‘The idea that my hospital is either safe or not safe is just not real; health and social
care is so big, so diverse’.
Having been ordered to abandon the HCC’s Annual Health Check because of the
limited value of single-word summary judgments of hospital quality (West, 2010), the
CQC published inspection findings for its 16 different quality standards. However, the
public struggled to make sense of the sheer number of standards (Nuffield Trust, 2013).
Under pressure from the government to return to a simpler Ofsted-style summary judge-
ment (DoH, 2012), the CQC now publishes consolidated inspection grades and risk
ratings, but, as before, that is unlikely to help patients select the best provider.
Ratings have also faced fierce sectorial resistance from medical professionals.
Describing the construction of CHI’s first star rating system, a former DoH advisor
recalled in his interview with us that:
When we started this, we … thought we were just adding another piece of bureaucracy,
but … inspecting one of the best heart surgeons in the world is different from inspecting a
primary school teacher. There was a lot of … anger [and] noise in the system. Instead of
recognising the interest of CHI, people were rather ‘how dare you?’
One notable example was in 2015, when GPs complained fiercely about the accuracy and
effects on public confidence of the CQC’s published statistical risk ratings of surgeries
(Millett, 2015). The CQC was subsequently forced to publish only raw statistics and to
‘change the language used to highlight variation between practices so that it does not
imply a risk to patient safety’ (CQC, 2015d). But just as the Labour Prime Minister
Callaghan in 1976 famously questioned whose interests the ‘secret garden’ of educational
professionals was serving, so doctors have found it increasingly hard to close off their
own private Eden. For example, the Society for Cardiac Surgery began publishing its own
risk-adjusted mortality rates for cardiac surgeons in 2007 in an effort to pre-empt the sort
of externally imposed rating schemes that NHS England began publishing for other
surgical specialisms in 2013.
Publicly naming and shaming NHS services is also politically sensitive. As former
CQC chair Baroness Young testified to the Francis Inquiry:
regulating services provided by a Government Minister, was… always going to be incredibly
fraught, because inevitably both the Department and Ministers were torn between wanting
good, strong independent regulation of healthcare and knowing that… from time to time they
would be put in the dock and found wanting. (Francis, 2013, p. 941)
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Another current regulator described to us the difficult conversations with ministers about
what to do:
in the run up to the election … the Prime Minister and secretary of state are desperate to keep
the health sector quiet … so we do get a fair amount of ‘you’re not going to do anything
that’s going to be noisy, are you?’ to which we tend to go back with … ‘if we don’t do
something in this particular case, it’s likely that patients are dying, you don’t really want that
on your conscience, do you?’
Given these difficulties, the risk-based enforcement pyramid provides little help to
regulators struggling to ensure care quality in the NHS.
Discussion
For many years now, a central dogma of international regulatory reform programmes has
been that risk-based regulation is ‘better regulation’ and that it will help regulators define
regulatory goals, monitor performance, and secure compliance with them in more effec-
tive, economical, proportionate, and publicly legitimate ways. However our findings show
that risk-based reforms of quality regulation in the NHS have consistently failed to deliver
on those promises.
There are at least four reasons why risk-based regulation has not worked. First,
ambiguities in the very idea of healthcare quality have made it impossible to define
clear and enduring goals for regulating it in terms of risk. The instability of risk-based
regulatory goals is partly due to healthcare being a matter of universal concern, involving
powerful interest groups and, in the case of the NHS, assuming totemic significance as a
symbol of national identity. However, the tendency for competing regulatory desiderata to
get layered on top of each other in unstable configurations owes more to the difficulties so
influentially described by Donabedian (1988) in defining ‘quality’ than to the political
dynamics of healthcare per se. After all, quality regulation in other domains, such as
higher education, has suffered from similar difficulties in defining clear and uncontested
goals in terms of competing input, process, and outcome measures.
Second, regulators have struggled to agree on, or sometimes even acknowledge, the
trade-offs between competing desiderata implicit in the concept of ‘acceptable risk’.
While such trade-offs are accepted in some policy domains such as workplace safety, it
has proved much harder to secure agreement in healthcare, not least because of the
difficulty in reconciling conflicts between public expectations of universal provision of
safe healthcare, professional views of clinical effectiveness, and managerial concerns for
cost control. Moreover, even if ex ante agreement could be reached on what risks are in
principle acceptable, the high public saliency and political sensitivity of the NHS means
that adverse outcomes are rarely regarded as acceptable, ex post, when they come to light.
Third, despite access to what is probably the most comprehensive database on out-
comes and performance for any regulated sector in the world, NHS regulators have also
struggled to assess risks to quality, identify which providers are at greatest risk of failing
to meet quality standards, or prioritise inspections accordingly. Reasons include difficul-
ties in: making credible inspection judgements about complex healthcare organisations;
devising appropriate indicators to capture outcomes for patients and ‘what matters’ to
them; interpreting vast quantities of heterogeneous and conflicting data; and adapting
measurement methods to combat gaming and frequent changes in policy and in the
organisation of healthcare and regulation.
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Fourth, calibrating regulatory interventions according to risk has also proved impractical.
Punitive responses to non-compliance can compromise the quality and continuity of health-
care delivery, making any intervention – proportionate to risk or otherwise – difficult. More
compliance-oriented levers for improving quality such as earned autonomy, education and
advice, or public disclosure, however, can create perverse incentives, alienate expert clinical
staff or fail to supply sufficiently granular information about performance to be useful in
leveraging change in a sector characteristically dominated by monopolistic provision. Those
problems have been compounded by the scale of the problems in some healthcare sectors. For
example, with more than 80% of the acute trusts inspected in England over the last 2 years
found to be ‘inadequate’ or to ‘require improvement’ (Griffiths et al., 2016), the regulatory
challenge is not one of targeting the odd ‘bad apple’ but fixing the whole ‘barrel’.
Why then, after a decade of repeated failures, are healthcare regulators still committed
to risk-based regulation? There are perhaps three answers to that question, which draw
inspiration from neo-institutionalist theory and its emphasis on coercive, normative, and
mimetic drivers of organisational behaviour (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). First, the CQC
has no choice. Keen to cut costs and reduce regulatory burdens, successive governments
in the UK have aggressively promoted risk-based reforms. Indeed, for nearly a decade
now, all UK regulators have been legally mandated to ‘base their regulatory activities on
risk’ (BIS, 2014, para. 3). While departing from this ‘best practice’ is not an option,
ambiguity about what it actually means has allowed care quality regulators to maintain
their commitment to being ‘risk-based’ despite remarkable instability in their organisa-
tional structure, regulatory models, and policy tools.
A second reason for the continued commitment to risk-based regulation is its norma-
tive appeal. Like new toothpaste brands, risk-based tools invariably promise to be cheaper,
better targeted, and more effective than their predecessors. Faced with the Sisyphean task
of ensuring quality across a hugely complex, crisis-prone, and politically sensitive sector,
healthcare regulators find those promises particularly alluring. At the same time ceaseless
reform, both of the NHS and its regulators, has eroded institutional memory and helped to
shield risk-based regulation from critical tests of its core promises. Thus, proponents of
statistical surveillance still ‘find it hard to believe that there are not some prior indications
of when quality of care may be at risk’ (Bardsley, 2016, p. 2), even in the face of repeated
failures and clear evidence that ‘big data’ analytics has not worked (Griffiths et al., 2016).
Third, the continuing recourse to risk-based approaches also reflects mimetic pressures to
secure legitimacy through conformity with prevailing organisational fashions. Rather than
leading to questions about the appropriateness of this strategy, successive failures of risk-
based quality regulation have instead led to changes in institutional structure and leadership.
Organisations in that context are classically vulnerable to the mimetic appeal of technical
systems peddled by international management consultancies (Larner & Laurie, 2010).
Certainly, the CQC often brags about its ‘leading-edge thinking’ (Public Accounts
Committee (PAC), 2015) on statistical surveillance, even though its Intelligent Monitoring
system – which it procured from the consultancy firm McKinsey through a faulty tendering
process (DoH, 2015) – does not actually work. As Porter (1995) has observed, it is not
uncommon for organisations to look to numerical and calculative rationales to augment their
legitimacy irrespective of methodological validity.
But more than simply wowing them with numbers, risk-based approaches are also
appealing to healthcare regulators as a way of accounting for the inevitable limits of what
they can do to ensure quality (Rothstein, 2006). After all the language of risk is a powerful
way of deflecting blame by rationalising adverse events as outcomes that were in principle
acceptable ex ante, given limited resources and competing demands upon them. The
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problem is that in healthcare, despite lip service sometimes paid to those limits, expecta-
tions are high, the need for trade-offs often denied, and adverse quality outcomes often
treated as regulatory failures. In this context of restricted tolerability of risk, risk-based
approaches to regulating the NHS are likely to fail.
Conclusion
In this article, we have used the case of regulating health care quality in the NHS to identify
some more general challenges facing risk-based approaches to healthcare regulation. From
our case, it is possible to distil several preconditions for successful risk-based regulation:
(i) Regulatory goals must be clear and trade-offs between them amenable to ex ante
agreement;
(ii) Regulators must be able to reliably assess the probability and consequences of
adverse outcomes that are potentially unacceptable;
(iii) Regulators must have a range of enforcement tools that they can deploy effec-
tively in response to increasing risk;
(iv) There must be political tolerance ex post for adverse outcomes that had been
defined ex ante as acceptable risks.
Many of these preconditions do not hold for healthcare regulation in England. The
symbolic importance of the NHS creates difficulties for ministers in both publicly
acknowledging the limits to what the NHS can deliver (i) and in avoiding blame when
things go wrong (iv). Accepting limits and tolerating failures might be less of an issue in
other healthcare systems where accountabilities are more diffuse, such as in the US and
Germany. However, those systems are more fragmented, which creates other barriers to
risk-based regulation by making comprehensive risk assessment (ii) and risk-based enfor-
cement (iii) more difficult.
The lessons from this research go well beyond healthcare. Risk promises to make
regulation more effective and proportionate across policy domains. However, risk-based
reforms are unlikely to succeed when goals are ambiguous or contested, failures hard to
spot in advance, and political tolerance of adverse outcomes uncertain.
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